Inequality and schooling responses to globalization forces: lessons from history by Jeffrey G. Williamson
22






iven  the  intensity  of  the  current  debate  about  the  impact  of 
globalization on brain drain in the Third World and inequality in the 
First World, it might be useful to look at these forces during the first 
global century, ending in 1914. This paper reviews what we know about the 
impact of trade and mass migration on low-wage, labor-abundant European 
economies and high-wage, labor-scarce overseas New World economies.1 It 
reviews the distribution impact everywhere in the Atlantic economy, the extent 
of the European brain drain, and the schooling responses in both Europe and 
the United States.
The Impact of Globalization on Income Distribution 
in the Pre-1914 Atlantic Economy
The Heckscher–Ohlin Prediction
Shortly after the First World War, Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin looked back 
on the nineteenth century and pondered the distributional consequences of glo-
balization. They argued that trade and labor migration must have had important 
income distribution consequences in both Europe and the New World (Flam and 
Flanders 1991, 90–92). The high-wage New World countries must have become 
more unequal, while the low-wage European countries must have become more 22  Jeffrey G. Williamson
equal, ceteris paribus. After all, trade would use abundant land and skills in 
the New World—lowering unskilled labor’s income relative to that of landlords 
and skilled workers—and abundant unskilled labor in Europe—raising unskilled 
labor’s income relative to that of landlords and skilled workers. The emigration 
of unskilled and poorly schooled Europeans to the New World should have rein-
forced the trade impact. These Heckscher–Ohlin predictions were formalized by 
Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson (1941) to become central pillars of modern 
trade theory.
The insights of Heckscher and Ohlin still inform public debate today, as 
evidenced by the ongoing controversy about the causes of the late twentieth 
century rise in inequality in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) nations. Has globalization led to an increase in wage inequality 
in the rich, skill-abundant First World, while reducing it in the poor, unskilled-
labor-abundant Third World? Does immigration to the First World displace native 
unskilled workers, leading to wage inequality? And does Third World emigration 
raise wages and reduce inequality?
Given the intensity of the current debate over these questions, it might be 
useful to review what we know about nineteenth century globalization experi-
ence—the first global century. Since Heckscher and Ohlin thought that trade 
and mass migration worked together to make factor prices converge, what did 
that imply for changes in income distribution more generally? Labor’s wage 
should have fallen relative to land rents in the New World. Since landlords 
were at the top of the distribution pyramid, skilled labor in the middle, and 
unskilled workers at the bottom, globalization (trade and migration) should 
have contributed to rising inequality in the resource- and skill-abundant New 
World. Similarly, globalization should have contributed to rising wages relative 
to land rents and skill premia in Europe, and thus to falling inequality there. 
Were Heckscher and Ohlin right?
The Historical Inequality Facts
The evolution of relative factor prices has been documented for the late nine-
teenth century Atlantic economy, so we can explore whether the big globalization 
winners were New World land and European labor and whether the big losers 
were European land and New World labor. Were nineteenth century globalization 
forces strong enough to leave their inequality mark? After all, the Heckscher–Oh-
lin predictions are based on a static trade theory that assumes trade and mass mi-
gration were the only shocks affecting the world economy. Nothing could be fur-
ther from the truth. This was a period of dramatic industrialization, technological 
change, and demographic revolution—forces that also must have had an impact 
on real wages, farm rents, and income distribution more generally. In particular, 
economic growth meant that wages in the New World were rising rapidly, so 22  Inequality and Schooling Responses to Globalization Forces
American and Australian unskilled labor certainly did not lose in absolute terms. 
In the expanding world of the late nineteenth century, trade and mass migration 
meant that European real wages grew more rapidly than they otherwise would 
have, and it meant that New World real wages grew less rapidly than they other-
wise would have. Clearly, factor price trends cannot by themselves tell us whether 
these counterfactual predictions were fulfilled, but recent empirical analysis has 
shown the predictions to be accurate.
There are four questions that we can sensibly ask of the historical data. First, 
did real wages converge in the late nineteenth century Atlantic economy? Second, 
did land rents converge? Third, was there relative factor price convergence? That 
is, did the ratio of wages to rents rise in Europe and fall in the New World? Finally, 
if there was relative factor price convergence, did it translate into rising inequality 
in the New World and falling inequality in Europe?
Elsewhere, the first question has been examined using real wages adjusted 
for purchasing power parity, and the answer was an unambiguous yes (Hatton 
and Williamson 2005, Chapter 6). There was real wage convergence within the 
Atlantic economy during the late nineteenth century, and the bulk of this conver-
gence was accounted for by convergence between Europe and the New World.
To answer the second and third questions, we need rent data for land of 
comparable quality across countries and over time. Alas, such data are unavail-
able. Nevertheless, if we make the plausible assumptions that European qual-
ity-adjusted land was initially more expensive than New World quality-adjusted 
land and that land rents moved like land prices, land rent convergence during 
this period is a certainty. Between 1870 and 1910, real land prices increased in 
Australia by 400 percent and in the U.S. by 250 percent, far greater than the big-
gest real land price increases we can document for Europe (Denmark, where 
land prices increased by only 45 percent: O’Rourke and Williamson 1999, Figures 
4.1–4.3). Moreover, in three important European countries—Britain, France, and 
Sweden—land prices actually fell, in Britain by over 50 percent. Land rents and 
values rose in the American Midwest, the Australian outback, and the Argentine 
pampas relative to those in Europe, as predicted.
It is the third question that is really central to any test of any globalization 
theory, especially in the context of a growing economy and especially because 
the theory relies so heavily on relative factor endowments and relative factor 
prices. The second column of Table 1 documents the evolution of the ratio of 
wages to land rent for three New World immigration countries—Argentina, Aus-
tralia, and the United States; for four European free trading and high-emigrating 
countries—Denmark, Britain, Ireland, and Sweden; and for three European pro-
tectionist and low-emigrating countries—France, Germany, and Spain.2 Relative 
factor price convergence certainly characterized the period from 1870 to 1913. In 
the New World, the wage–rental ratio plunged. By 1913, the Australian ratio had 22  Jeffrey G. Williamson
fallen to one quarter of its 1870 level, the Argentine ratio had fallen to one-fifth of 
its mid-1880 level, and the U.S. ratio had fallen to less than half its 1870 level. In 
Europe, the ratio boomed. The British ratio in 1910 had increased by a factor of 
2.7 over its 1870 level, while the Irish ratio had increased even more, by a factor 
of 5.5. The Swedish and Danish ratios had both increased by a factor of 2.3. This 
increase was less pronounced in protectionist and low emigrating economies. 
The ratio increased by a factor of 1.8 in France and 1.4 in Germany and not at 
all in Spain. 
Of course, correlation is not causation. Just as rising inequality in the OECD 
	 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
  Real wage  Wage–land  Real GDP  Real GDP per
  per urban worker  rental ratio  per capita  worker-hour
  1870–1913   1870–1910   1870–1913  1870–1913
.
Denmark. .2.63.. 2.85. .1.57. .1.90.
Finland.. n.a... n.a... 1.44.. 1.80.
Norway.. 2.43.. n.a... 1.31.. 1.65.
Sweden. 2.73.. 2.45. .1.46. .1.74.
Italy. 1.74.. n.a... 1.28.. 1.33.
Portugal.. .37.. n.a... .69.. 1.10.
Spain. .44. .–.43. .1.11.. 1.52
Austria. n.a.. n.a.. 1.46.. 1.76
Ireland. 1.79.. 4.39.. n.a.. n.a.
The European Periphery  1.73.. 2.32. .1.29. .1.60
.
Belgium. .92.. n.a... 1.05.. 1.24.
France. .91.. 1.80. .1.30. 1.58.
Germany. 1.02.. .87. .1.63. 1.88.
Great.Britain. 1.03.. 2.54. .1.01. 1.23.
The.Netherlands. .64.. n.a.. 1.01.. 1.34.
Switzerland. n.a... n.a.. 1.20.. 1.46.
The European Industrial Core  .90.. 1.74. .1.20. 1.46
 
Europe  1.39.. 2.10. .1.25. .1.54
.
Argentina. 1.74.. –4.06. n.a... n.a..
Australia. .14. .–3.30. ..87. 1.08.
Canada. 1.65.. n.a.. 2.29. 2.31.
U.S.. 1.04. .–1.72. 1.81. 1.93.
New World  1.14. .–3.03. 1.66. 1.77 
SOURCE: O’Rourke and Williamson (1999, Table 2.2).
Table 1 
Relative Economic Performance of the European Periphery 
in the Late 19th Century: Growth Per Annum (Percent)229  Inequality and Schooling Responses to Globalization Forces
after the 1970s may have plausibly been due to technical change rather than glo-
balization, so, too, other forces may have affected nineteenth century income dis-
tribution independent of any globalization-induced shocks. But what factor price 
evidence we have seems to offer support for the predicted impact of mass migra-
tion and the trade boom on late nineteenth century income distribution. While 
real wages grew everywhere before 1913, they grew faster in labor-abundant Eu-
rope than in the labor-scarce New World. Rents surged in overseas land-abundant 
countries and plunged in land-scarce European countries. And the wage–rental 
ratio increased dramatically in Europe, especially in free-trading and high-emi-
grating countries, while it declined equally dramatically in the frontier economies 
overseas. All in all, globalization had exactly its predicted impact on relative factor 
prices around the Atlantic economy from the mid-nineteenth century to World 
War I (O’Rourke, Taylor, and Williamson 1996).
What about trends in inequality more generally? Complete income distribu-
tions are unavailable before World War I, except for a few countries and a few 
benchmark dates. But even if they were available, it is not obvious that we would 
want to rely on them when considering the impact of mass migration. Like econo-
mists involved in debates about more recent distributional experience, our inter-
est is in the structure of factor prices and factor rewards—the size of the average 
income gap between the upper and lower classes. Indeed, if rising inequality was 
explained by more unskilled workers who were all new immigrants, the rising 
inequality would be far less interesting and certainly less dangerous politically. 
But suppose the immigrants also lowered the relative incomes of the poor native-
born with whom new immigrants competed? Inequality trends of this sort are far 
more interesting and have more dangerous political implications.
How, then, did the typical unskilled worker do relative to the average income 
recipient—that is, how did the ratio of the unskilled wage (w) to GDP per worker 
hour (y) trend over time? Changes in the ratio w/y measure changes in the eco-
nomic distance between the working poor near the bottom of the distribution and 
the average-income recipient in the middle of the distribution. When the index is 
normalized by setting w/y equal to 100 in 1870, we get the following: Powerful 
Danish and Swedish equality trends establish the upper bound (the index rises 
from 100 to as high as 154), and powerful Australian and U.S. inequality trends es-
tablish the lower bound (the index falls from 100 to as low as 58). An alternative 
way to standardize these distributional trends is to compute the annual percent-
age change in the index relative to its 1870 base. The per annum rates of change 
range from 0.98 for Sweden to –1.45 for the United States.
This measure of the annual rate of change in inequality is plotted against the 
1870 real wage in Figure 1, and it offers a stunning confirmation of the global-
ization–inequality hypothesis. Between 1870 and 1913, inequality rose dramati-
cally in rich, land-abundant, labor-scarce New World countries like the United 230  Jeffrey G. Williamson
States; inequality fell dramatically in poor, land-scarce, labor-abundant, newly 
industrializing countries like Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Italy. Inequality was 
more stable in European industrial economies like Belgium, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. And inequality was also more stable 
in the poor European economies that failed to play the globalization game, like 
Portugal and Spain.
When Simon Kuznets gave his presidential address to the American Econom-
ic Association in 1955, he hypothesized that inequality should rise in early stages 
of modern development, reach a peak during what we have come to call the 
newly industrialized-country stage, and fall thereafter. Since then, the thesis has 
taken a beating, most recently by a newly constructed late twentieth century da-
tabase (Deininger and Squire 1996). What is surprising about this Kuznets curve 
literature, however, is that it treats a very complex problem so simply. A number 
of forces can drive inequality in the long run: mass migration, trade, demogra-
phy, schooling, and technology. The technological forces Kuznets thought were 
pushing his curve cannot by themselves explain the trends in Figure 1, because 
while inequality should have been on the rise in newly industrializing but poor 
European countries, it was not. And while it should have been on the decline in 
richer, more mature industrial economies, it was not.
It appears likely that globalization was producing those late nineteenth cen-
tury Atlantic economy distribution trends. Furthermore, I think that mass migra-
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SOURCE: Williamson (1997, Figure 6).231  Inequality and Schooling Responses to Globalization Forces
tion was the most important part of that globalization-distribution connection. 
As I already noted, the mass migration significantly influenced labor supplies in 
sending and receiving countries. I also noted that migration’s impact on the labor 
force was highly correlated with initial labor scarcity, causing the biggest reduc-
tions in low-wage emigrating countries and the biggest increases in high-wage 
immigration countries. Figure 2 plots the migration–inequality connection. Where 
immigration had a large positive impact on the labor force, inequality underwent 
a steep rise. Where emigration had a large negative impact on the labor force, 
inequality underwent a steep fall.
Mass migration appears, therefore, to be the leading candidate in accounting 
for the distribution trends we observe in the Atlantic economy. I stress the word 
appears since it is impossible to decompose globalization effects into trade and 
migration, given that the correlation between migration’s impact, trade’s impact, 
and initial labor scarcity is so high. Yet, an effort has been made to finesse this 
problem by constructing a trade-globalization-impact variable as the interaction 
of initial labor scarcity and openness (Williamson 1997). The former is proxied 
by dummies for the labor-scarce New World (d1), the labor-abundant European 
periphery (d2), and the core European industrial leaders making up the remainder 
of countries. Openness is proxied by trade shares (trade). The per annum rate of 
Figure 2
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SOURCE: Williamson (1997, Figure 7).232  Jeffrey G. Williamson
change in the equality index, here called e, is explained by (R2 = 0.72, t statistics 
in parentheses):
(1)        e = –52.07 − .31mig + .25trade + .55(d1 * trade) + 2.42(d2 * trade),
                            (2.56)     (1.00)       (0.36)               (3.38)
where mig stands for the impact of net migration on labor supplies. The impact of 
mass migration is powerful, significant, and of the right sign. When immigration rates 
were big, e was small and inegalitarian trends were strong. When immigration rates 
were small, e was bigger, and thus inegalitarian trends were weaker. And when emi-
gration rates were big, e was even bigger, and thus egalitarian trends were strong.
Around the European periphery, the more-open economies had more egali-
tarian trends (bigger trade implying bigger e, [.25 + 2.42] * trade). It appears that 
the open, industrializing “tigers” of that time enjoyed benign egalitarian trends, 
while  those  opting  for  autarky  did  not.  Furthermore,  the  coefficient  2.42  on 
(d2 * trade) passes conventional significance tests. In the European industrial 
core, the effect was far less powerful since the smaller coefficient 0.25 on trade 
does not pass any significance test. It appears that open-economy effects on in-
come distribution were ambiguous among the European industrial leaders with 
moderate initial income levels. In the labor-scarce New World, however, the more 
open economies also had more egalitarian trends ([.25 + .55 ] * trade), which is 
certainly not what Heckscher and Ohlin would have predicted. The result is not 
statistically significant, however.
Overall, I read this evidence as strong support for the impact of mass mi-
gration on distribution trends. The effects were big everywhere in the Atlantic 
economy where the migrations were big. The evidence offers weak support, 
however, for the impact of trade on distribution trends, except around the Eu-
ropean periphery where trade lowered inequality. This econometric exercise ex-
plains about two-thirds of the variance in distributional trends across the late 
nineteenth century.
The  globalization–inequality  connection  in  high-wage  countries  was  bro-
ken after 1913. Figure 3 shows the correlation between distributional trends as 
measured by changes in w/y and a 1921 real wage measure of labor scarcity.   
The late nineteenth century inverse correlation has completely disappeared, re-
placed by a positive correlation. In the interwar period of deglobalization, the 
poorer  countries  experienced  sharply  increasing  inequality  while  the  richer 
countries  experienced  more  moderate  increases  or,  in  four  cases,  egalitarian 
trends. This finding is consistent with both the cessation of the mass migrations 
and with the Stolper–Samuelson theorem: Protection should raise demand for 
the scarce factor, thus improving the position of the unskilled in rich countries 
and contributing to egalitarian trends while eroding the position of the unskilled   233  Inequality and Schooling Responses to Globalization Forces
in poor countries and contributing to inegalitarian trends. Whether it really was 
deglobalization  that  precipitated  this  dramatic  switch  in  distribution  trends  has   
yet to be established with firmer evidence, but there seems to be no doubt about 
the switch itself. The pre-1913 egalitarian trends in Scandinavia and Italy disap-
peared and were replaced by post-1921 inequality trends. The pre-1913 inequal-
ity trends in the New World disappeared and were replaced by post-1921 egali-
tarian trends. This change, seen as a revolutionary leveling at the time, has been   
confirmed by better data since (Goldin and Margo 1992; Goldin and Katz 2001). And 
the relatively stable pre-1913 distribution trends in industrial France and Germany 
were replaced by dramatic post-1921 inequality trends (Piketty and Saez 2003).
A Closer Look at the Impact of Immigrants on High-Wage Labor Markets
The impact of immigrants on labor markets obsessed contemporary Ameri-
can observers. Here we confront two questions as relevant today as when they 
were posed almost a century ago, when the Immigration Commission published 
its 1911 report: Did immigrants crowd out natives and reduce their wages? It ap-
pears they did.
Claudia Goldin (1994) estimates the correlation between immigration and 
wage changes across cities between 1890 and 1915, finding that a 1 percentage 
point increase in the foreign-born share reduced unskilled wage rates by 1 to 1.5 
percent. Another study estimates the impact of immigration on the real (unskilled) 
Figure 3






























































SOURCE: Williamson (1997, Figure 9).23  Jeffrey G. Williamson
wage by looking at the wage adjustment mechanism from time-series data. By 
altering labor supply and unemployment in the short run, immigration should 
have driven down the wage along some long-run Phillips curve. The long-run 
solution to one such model estimated for 1890–1913 suggests that holding output 
constant, an increase in the labor force of 1 percent lowered the real wage in the 
long run by 0.4 or 0.5 percent (Hatton and Williamson 1998, Table 8.6). Based on 
the stock of foreign-born and their children enumerated in the 1910 census, im-
migration after 1890 accounted for about 12 percent of the 1910 labor force and 
immigration after 1870 accounted for about 27 percent of the 1910 labor force. 
These magnitudes suggest that the real (unskilled) wage would have been 5 to 
6 percent higher in the absence of immigration after 1890 and 11 to 14 percent 
higher in the absence of immigration after 1870.
Both the cross-section and time-series results are consistent with those based 
on computable general-equilibrium models. The first effort to apply a computable 
general-equilibrium model to the late nineteenth century United States estimates 
that immigration after 1870 lowered real wages in 1910 by 11 percent (Williamson 
1974, 387), almost identical to the time-series estimate. A more recent computable 
general-equilibrium experiment gets pretty much the same result: Immigration re-
duced urban real wages in 1910 by 9.2 percent (O’Rourke, Williamson, and Hatton 
1994, 209).
In short, it appears that there were powerful crowding-out forces at work in 
immigrant countries before World War I and that they contributed to the rising 
inequality observed there.
The Impact of Anti-Immigration Policy on the American Labor Force
The United States was the biggest immigrant labor market, so our focus is 
there. Whether due to a switch to restrictive immigration policy, war, the Great 
Depression, or all three in concert, did the labor force and population growth 
rate slow down in the three decades after 1913? If so, how much of the decline 
can be attributed to declining immigration? Only if we can show that a decline in 
immigration contributed to a labor force slowdown can we ask whether it had an 
impact on developments within the U.S. economy. 
Three studies have explored the impact of immigration on U.S. population 
and labor supply in the interwar years, but I believe that all three ask the wrong 
question. Kuznets and Ernest Rubin (1954) adopt a foreign-born measure and 
count net migrants of labor force age but also immigrant children born abroad as 
they reach employment age. Richard Easterlin’s (1968) measure is narrower and 
excludes the impact of immigrant children. More recently, Henry Gemery (1994) 
extends the analysis using the Easterlin measure, the narrow definition that I also 
use in what follows. However, all of these scholars only measure the share of 
the actual labor force or population increase accounted for by immigrants. While 23  Inequality and Schooling Responses to Globalization Forces
such accounting decompositions are useful, they do not assess the impact of the 
demise of mass migration on labor force or population growth. What we want 
instead are estimates of a counterfactual world where the mass migrations con-
tinued. Only then can we identify the role of the demise of mass migration.
Consider first the extent of the labor force slowdown. Table 2 documents 
a dramatic fall in the U.S. labor force growth rate from 2.29 percent per annum 
over the three decades 1880–1910 to 1.14 percent per annum over the three de-
cades 1910–40. This slowing in the rate of labor supply growth amounted to 1.15 
percentage points—a massive regime switch in which the growth rate was cut 
in half. Whether we would find similar large numbers for other, less-adequately 
documented immigrant countries would depend on two factors.
First, which economies were most dependent on immigration prior to the Great 
War? The answer to that question has been reported elsewhere for both sending and 
receiving countries (Hatton and Williamson 2005, Table 6.2). Immigration between 
1870 and 1910 served to raise the 1910 labor force of Argentina by 86 percent, Can-
ada by 44 percent, Australia by 42 percent, and the U.S. by 24 percent. Emigration 
between 1870 and 1910 served to lower the 1910 labor force in Ireland by 45 percent, 
Italy by 39 percent, Norway by 24 percent, and Sweden by 20 percent.
Second, which economies experienced the biggest fall in mass migration? 
With that evidence in hand, we would then predict that the biggest labor force 
slowdown occurred in economies where net migration had the biggest impact 
  Labor force  Percentage
  growth rate  due to net
  (percent per annum)   immigration
Actuals 
1880–1910. .2.29.. 40.1
1910 –1940.. 1.14.. 11.6








SOURCE: Hatton and Williamson (2005, Table 9.3).
Table 2 
U.S. Labor Force Growth, 1910–40: Some Counterfactuals23  Jeffrey G. Williamson
on prewar labor force totals and where across-border net migration underwent 
the biggest decline after 1913. Australia would be one such candidate; indeed, 
the rate of labor force growth in Australia fell by 1.41 percentage points between 
1870–1913 and 1913–38 (Maddison 1994, 266). The other immigrant countries are 
harder to document, but similar magnitudes seem likely.
Next, does the demise of mass migration explain the big slowdown? Table 
2 poses the following counterfactual: What would have been the labor force 
growth rate between 1910 and 1940 had the 1880–1910 immigration experience 
persisted? The counterfactuals are calculated to take account of two forces. First, 
immigration into the U.S. fell after 1910. So, what would have been the impact 
over the 1910–40 period if, on the one hand, the immigration rate had maintained 
the 1880–1910 average thereafter and if, on the other hand, the absolute level 
of immigration had maintained the 1880–1910 average thereafter? The pre-1910 
rate sets an upper bound, while the pre-1910 level sets a lower bound on the 
counterfactual impact. These counterfactuals are reported in the second panel 
of Table 2. Second, the age and sex distribution of the immigrants changed dra-
matically—partly induced by immigration policy—thereby serving to lower the 
labor participation rate of the interwar immigrants. So, what would have been the 
impact on pre-1910 labor force growth if, in addition, the immigrant labor partici-
pation rate had maintained its pre-1910 average thereafter? These counterfactuals 
are reported in the third panel of Table 2.
The bottom line is this. The observed decline in the rate of labor force growth 
between the pre- and post-1910 periods was 1.15 percentage points, but the no-
mass-migration-demise counterfactual decline would have been only 0.47 (2.29 
– 1.82, panel 3) or 0.63 (2.29 – 1.66, panel 2) percentage points. The demise of 
mass migration accounted for 45 to 59 percent of the massive slowdown in U.S. 
labor force growth around World War I, or about half. Since the immigrants were 
more unskilled than the native-born (Hatton and Williamson 2005, Chapters 5 and 
15), it seems likely that the demise of mass migration contributed even more than 
half to any unskilled labor force growth slowdown.
The demise of mass migration wasn’t the only force at work, of course, since 
the crude birthrate in the U.S. also fell, from about 37 per thousand in the 1880s 
to about 18 per thousand in the 1930s. But the demise of immigration accounted 
for about half the changing demographic and labor supply growth events during 
the interwar years when the world went antiglobal.
Rising Schooling Supplies, Falling Immigrant Supplies, 
and the Great Leveling in America
When Paul Samuelson published the sixth edition of his famous Economics 
textbook in 1964, he made the following statement: “After World War I, laws were 
passed severely limiting immigration. Only a trickle of immigrants has been ad-23  Inequality and Schooling Responses to Globalization Forces
mitted since then. … By keeping labor supply down, immigration policy tends to 
keep wages high” (Samuelson 1964, cited in Borjas 2003, 2).
Writing in the same year, Stanley Lebergott, in Manpower in Economic Growth, 
joined Samuelson with this statement about the impact of the immigration quotas: 
“It [is] most unlikely that the rate of productivity advance or the nature of produc-
tivity advance changed so [much in the 1920s] as to explain [the spurt in real wage 
growth]. Instead we find that halting the flow of millions of migrants … offers a 
much more reasonable explanation” (Lebergott 1964, 27).
The economics underlying both statements is straightforward, and it goes 
back to the Dillingham Commission reports in 1911 and before. A glut in the 
labor supply lowers the wage relative to the returns to capital and rents on land. 
Since capital and land are held by those at the top of the distribution pyramid, 
immigration-induced labor supply growth should create more inequality and the 
demise of immigration should create less, ceteris paribus. Since immigrants were 
more unskilled than the native-born, immigration should also have raised the 
premium on skills as they got scarce relative to unskilled labor, and the demise 
of immigration should have reduced the premium on skills as they got relatively 
abundant, ceteris paribus.3
Not everyone has agreed with this traditional argument, mostly because of 
the ceteris paribus: Many other forces were driving the American economy, thus 
offering potential offsets to any measured immigrant glut or scarcity. Potential 
offsets invite debate. For example, Vernon Briggs (1984, 50) thought that the 
premise of the traditional argument was false, since he believed that immigration 
was still substantial in the 1920s and that productivity advance was very differ-
ent in rate and factor-saving bias. Others have argued that immigration generates 
accumulation responses, forces that would mute the immigration impact. I will 
not try to resolve this debate here but only pose the arguments and present an 
impressive and suggestive correlation in the historical time series.
We have already seen that during the mass migrations between 1870 and 
1913, rich labor-scarce countries with big immigration rates underwent rising 
inequality and poor labor-abundant countries with big emigration rates under-
went falling inequality. During the antiglobal and immigrant-restricted interwar 
years 1921–38, the correlation disappeared. Indeed, some previously emigrating 
countries like Italy underwent rising inequality, while some previously immigrat-
ing countries like Australia, Canada, and the United States underwent falling in-
equality. This is only a correlation, of course. Immigration policy may have been 
correlated with some omitted variables, and the omitted variables may have been 
driving this change. Still, the correlation keeps the immigration-breeds-inequality 
hypothesis on the table.
Now consider Figure 4, where I plot the correlation for the U.S. only, but over 
150 years. The figure is taken from a book that was published some time ago 23  Jeffrey G. Williamson
(Williamson and Lindert 1980), and the underlying data have been revised many 
times since. Still, those revisions have not overturned the correlation—namely, 
rapid rates of labor force growth in the United States took place during episodes 
when earnings inequality was on the rise and the skill premium was increasing, 
while slow labor force growth rates took place during episodes when earnings 
inequality was decreasing and the skill premium was falling. And note the ob-
servations that are the focus of this section: 1909–29 and 1929–48 in the lower 
left quadrant, where the skill premium was falling and the growth rates of the 
labor force were slow; and 1899–1909 in the upper right quadrant, where the 
skill premium was rising and the labor force growth rates were fast. Correlation 
is not causation, but Figure 4 is certainly consistent with the immigration-breeds-
inequality hypothesis.
The twentieth century evidence on the evolution of U.S. inequality has im-
proved over the past decade or so, and it confirms a great egalitarian leveling in 
American incomes between the first and second thirds of the century (Figure 5). 
The ratio of wages in the top to the bottom 10 percent in manufacturing fell by 
almost a third between 1890 and 1940, a period of labor force slowdown, half 
of which can be attributed to the demise of mass migration. Pay ratios of skilled 
to unskilled labor fell by two-thirds between 1907 and 1952. The ratio of college 
professors’ incomes to those of unskilled workers was cut in half between 1908 
and 1960. Weekly-wage dispersion measures among white men fell by more 
Figure 4
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than a quarter between 1940 and 1965, as did the share of the top 10 percent of 
income earners.
Among the authors contributing to the evidence in Figure 5, Goldin and Law-
rence Katz have made the greatest effort to explain the great leveling (Goldin and 
Margo 1992; Goldin and Katz 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2001), and the relative demand 
and supply of skills is central to their story: “[The] long-run change in the distribu-
tion of earnings is shaped by a race between the demand for skill, driven largely 
by industrial shifts and technological advances, and the supply of skill, altered 
by changes in educational investments, demographics and immigration” (Goldin 
and Katz 2001, 68).
While they are cautious, Goldin and Katz appear to favor the view that an 
exogenous and revolutionary change in the supply of secondary and tertiary 
schooling must have overwhelmed the skill-using bias that characterized twen-
tieth century economic progress. Such schooling forces would, of course, help 
erase the skill premium, compress the wage structure, and level incomes. But 
what about exogenous and revolutionary changes in unskilled labor supplies as-
Figure 5
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sociated in large part with the demise of mass migration? These policy-induced 
immigration forces would reinforce the policy-induced schooling forces. As the 
growth of the unskilled labor force slowed down, unskilled labor would have 
become scarcer relative to skilled labor.
If mass migration before the Great War contributed to high and rising in-
equality and skill scarcity in New World host countries, while its absence there 
after the quotas contributed to less equality and the decline in skill scarcity, we 
should see opposite trends in the European sending countries. While both sides 
of the Atlantic may have shared the same technological events and perhaps even 
the same schooling events (see below), the boom and bust in mass migration 
must have left different inequality marks on labor markets on either side of the 
Atlantic. Much more work remains to be done on this issue, but what evidence 
we have at hand seems to be consistent with the hypothesis. Two recent papers 
have documented skilled versus unskilled wage-gap trends for Europe and North 
America between 1870 and 1960, and they show the following.
First, the U.K. skilled-wage premium started falling in 1880, thirty-five years 
before it did in the U.S. and Canada in 1915 (Anderson 2001, 96; Betrán and Pons 
2004, 39). Second, while the skilled-wage premium declined very dramatically 
after 1915 in the U.S. and Canada, it declined only very modestly in the U.K. 
(Anderson 2001, 96; Betrán and Pons 2004, 39). And third, what is true for the 
Anglo–American comparison was also true for those involving Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden (Anderson 2001, 94; Betrán and Pons 2004, 
39). The mass migration boom and bust appears to be a good candidate to help 
explain the asymmetric inequality trends between Europe and the New World.
A good illustration of how policy-induced immigration forces created greater 
unskilled labor scarcity and lower inequality in the United States is not hard to 
find, and it involves disadvantaged black Americans. Did European immigrants 
crowd out southern blacks from northern jobs that offered much better earnings 
and living standards than did sharecropping in the South? This is an old ques-
tion that until recently was illustrated only by compelling correlations. Thirty-five 
years ago, Brinley Thomas (1972, 130–34, Chapter 18) noted the striking inverse 
correlation between black migration out of the South and European migration 
into northern cities. The problem left unanswered by these correlations, however, 
was causation. William Collins (1997) recently unraveled the issues of causation 
and supplied the answers. While only about a half-million southern blacks left 
for the urban North in the four decades before 1910, seven times that—about 
3.5 million—left in the four decades after 1910. By 1950, about 20 percent of all 
the blacks born in the South lived in the North, while the figure was only a little 
more than 4 percent at the turn of the century (Collins 1997, 607), or only a fifth 
of the 1950 figure. Not only did those who moved improve their economic lives, 
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and South declined sharply as the Great Black Migration served to better inte-
grate what had been regionally segmented labor markets (Wright 1986). Collins 
concludes that the mass migrations from Europe did indeed crowd out southern 
blacks from better jobs in the urban North, and, symmetrically, the demise of the 
mass migrations crowded them in. A very large share of the Great Black Migration 
can be explained by the disappearance of new European immigrants in northern 
U.S. cities after 1914. Since the Great Black Migration greatly improved the rela-
tive income position of blacks between 1910 and 1950, it helps account for the 
great leveling of incomes in the middle third of the twentieth century and offers 
one important channel through which exogenous changes in European mass 
migration contributed to the leveling.
Did the Presence of Immigrants Contribute to the Schooling Revolution  
in America?
Consistent with the evidence of the great leveling in the United States in the 
middle third of the twentieth century, Goldin and Katz (1999a, Tables 6 and 7) 
have documented a decline in the returns to schooling from World War I to the 
1960s. For young men, the return to a high school degree fell from 11–12 percent 
in 1914 to 7 percent in 1959, while the return to a college degree fell from about 
15 percent to 9 percent over the same period (Goldin and Katz 2001, Table 2.4). 
How much of this was due to a policy-induced scarcity of unskilled and poorly 
schooled immigrants who lowered the rate of return to schooling by raising the 
opportunity costs of staying in school and out of the labor market? How much of 
it was due, instead, to a schooling glut that lowered those rates? If it was a school-
ing glut, how much of that glut was triggered by exogenous policy changes and 
how much was an endogenous response to the observed skill scarcity created, at 
least in part, by the open immigration policy before 1914?
It is important to stress that the immigrant-scarcity and schooling-glut hypoth-
eses are not competing. Instead, they are mutually supporting. The exogenous 
and endogenous schooling hypotheses also need not be competing, since both 
forces might have been operating. Still, we would like to know which was most 
important.
Goldin and Katz clearly favor the exogenous-schooling hypothesis. There 
is no doubt that secondary school enrollment soared in the United States from 
1910 to 1940, rising from about 14 percent to 71 percent (Goldin 1998; Goldin 
and Katz 2001, 59–60, Figure 2.5), and an increasing number of the graduates 
took white-collar office and factory jobs. More and more high school students 
were using their diplomas in the marketplace, rather than solely as a way to gain 
entrance to college, and secondary schools increased the number of terminal de-
grees granted: “The increase in high school enrollments and graduation served to 
flood the market with literate and numerate workers whose skills enabled them 22  Jeffrey G. Williamson
to move into white-collar office jobs. It also increased the supply of those capable 
of filling blue-collar positions that required the reading of manuals, deciphering 
of blue-prints, computing of formulae, and use of elementary science” (Goldin 
and Katz 2001, 61).
Moreover, “‘mass’  secondary  school  education  was  unique  to  the  United 
States at that time. Most European countries did not have mass non-vocational, 
non-industrial secondary school education that was fully publicly funded until the 
post-World War II era” (Goldin and Katz 1999a, 15).
  But why did the U.S. high school movement begin around 1900 or 1910? 
Why not later, as was true of Europe? We may agree that the schooling supply re-
sponse helped erase schooling scarcity and inequality in America, but surely pre-
vious schooling scarcity played a role in triggering that supply response. Goldin 
and Katz think not and believe instead that it was the relative cultural and wealth 
homogeneity of the early twentieth century that explains the timing and location 
of the schooling boom. For them, the key was social and economic egalitarianism 
in America that supported the belief in externalities—especially in New England 
and the West, where the high school movement led the nation. Perhaps, but some 
part of the schooling boom must have been an endogenous response to the large 
skill premium, schooling scarcity, and a high return to education in the late nine-
teenth century, when mass migration reached its crescendo. 
The issue has not been resolved, but Rodney Ramcharan (2002) has offered 
some evidence supporting the schooling-endogeneity hypothesis, although his 
evidence also offers some support for the alternative offered by Goldin and Katz. 
Ramcharan’s results are reassuring for those, like me, who believe that schooling 
endogeneity and exogeneity forces were both at work.
Needless to say, the payoff to future research on the schooling-endogene-
ity hypothesis will be great, since it speaks to modern brain drain debates and 
whether and how human capital formation responds to mass migration in host 
and source country.
Brain Drain and Schooling Responses in Europe
Was There a European Brain Drain?
Fearing brain drain, there were legal restrictions in the eighteenth century on 
the emigration of artisans and engineers from Britain to the European continent. 
But public concerns about losing vital skills through emigration seem to have 
vanished by the late nineteenth century. There may have been good reasons for 
this. First, where positive selection was weak, it would not have made a major 
dent in the per capita skill base at home. Second, much of the human capital 
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financed by the public purse. Third, immigrant remittances from abroad may have 
offset the forgone income at home.
So was there a big brain drain from Europe during the age of mass migration? 
While there certainly was some within-country positive selection, it probably did 
not translate into big brain drains. Table 3 shows literacy rates (in any language) 
for five European countries among adult immigrants to the United States between 
1899 and 1909, as well as the literacy rates of the adult home populations in 
1901 (those who stayed behind). Literacy rates among immigrants were generally 
higher than they were among the source populations, implying positive selection. 
Perhaps this was inevitable: Immigrants were younger adults than the source 
adult populations, and, as I discuss below, there was a schooling revolution tak-
ing place in late nineteenth century Europe, raising literacy among the young 
movers compared with the old stayers (Easterlin 1981). Italy may appear to be an 
exception to this rule, but the observed lower literacy among immigrants relative 
to the Italian population simply reflects the dominance of poor southern Italians 
in the immigrant inflow.4 The third row of Table 3 reports the outflow of literate 
emigrants (over the decade) as a proportion of literate adults in the 1901 source 
population. For Britain and France, the decade’s loss to the United States was 
small in relation to the stock, less than 2 percent. It was larger for Italy because of 
its higher emigration rates. Spain’s and Portugal’s out-migration numbers would 
be higher if the flows to South America were included. But even then, the totals 
would be small.
Even if the human capital losses were small for Europe when measured in 
terms of education and literacy, they may have been larger in terms of unobserv-
able “best and brightest” characteristics. One piece of evidence supporting this 
view comes from Swedish clergymen’s evaluations of the intellectual abilities of 
their parishioners. Comparison of those who subsequently emigrated with those 
Table 3 
Literacy in Europe and the Brain Drain
  France  Britain  Italy  Spain  Portugal
.
Literacy.rate.of.adult.immigrants.to.the.
U.S..1899–1909.(percent). 94.6. 99.0. 47.0. 85.4. 31.8
Literacy.rate,.adult.stayers,.1901.(percent). 83. 97. 52. 44. 22
Literacy.loss.(outflow.of.literates.as.a.
percentage.of.literate.stayers). .4. 1.6. 8.6. .6. 2.0
School.enrollment.as.a.percentage.of.
literate.adult.stayers,.1901. 25.9. 23.4. 24.2. 31.3. 29.5
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who did not reveals that the former had a higher intellectual level, did better at 
school, and had a wider view of the world (Hvidt 1975, 109). On these grounds, 
one might have expected that immigrants to the New World were more likely than 
the native-born to become entrepreneurs and business leaders. Consistent with 
that prediction, it turns out that among those born between 1816 and 1850, im-
migrants were overrepresented among the top businessmen in the United States 
(Ferrie and Mokyr 1994). This evidence of positive selection and brain drain was 
much less apparent among those born between 1850 and 1890, reflecting the 
declining quality of U.S. immigrants as origin countries shifted. 
Were There Schooling Responses in Europe?
If a supply glut of poorly schooled and poorly skilled immigrants helped 
raise the relative scarcity of skills in the United States before the quotas and thus 
helped create a high school revolution in America, why wouldn’t the same skill 
scarcity encourage schooling at home in Europe, at least at the primary level?
The 1917 Literacy Act imposed a literacy test that was precisely the mode 
of restriction Congress had debated since 1895. The idea was that the literacy 
requirement would ensure a rise in the quality of immigrants, a change in their 
source (favoring more advanced Western Europe), and a reduction in their num-
bers (Hatton and Williamson 2005, Chapter 8). Congress was to be disappointed. 
The literacy test (in English or some other language) proved ineffective in stem-
ming the inflow at the end of the Great War, mainly because a revolution in the 
provision of free and public elementary education had spread east and south to 
backward and illiterate Europe from the 1880s onwards (Easterlin 1981; Lindert 
2003). 
As one of the biggest immigrant sources by 1910, Italy illustrates the Euro-
pean schooling revolution well. Between 1881 and 1931, Italian regional literacy 
rates soared, from less than 20 percent to more than 60 percent in southern Italy, 
Sicily, and Sardinia; from less than 35 percent to almost 80 percent in central Italy; 
from about 40 percent to about 85 percent in Venice and Emilia; and from almost 
60 percent to more than 95 percent in the northern industrial triangle (Kirk 1946, 
183–85). The literacy rate for Italy as a whole was about 80 percent by 1931. Of 
course, the rate for young adults is much more relevant for any prediction regard-
ing the effectiveness of the 1917 Literacy Act, because these were the individu-
als most responsive to labor market signals. The literacy rate in poor European 
source countries (including Italy) for those aged 15 to 29 ranged from 80 to 83 
percent in 1931 (Kirk 1946, Table 12, 189). No wonder the literacy criteria failed 
to effectively bar immigrants from poor European countries.
Just as it might be doubted that the U.S. high school revolution was exog-
enous to labor market skill scarcity, it might also be doubted that the European 2  Inequality and Schooling Responses to Globalization Forces
literacy revolution was exogenous to labor market demands, both being driven 
in part by mass migration.
Comparative Economic History and the Present
The first global century before 1914 had profound effects on both low-wage, 
labor-abundant Europe and the high-wage, labor-scarce New World. Trade and 
especially mass migration contributed to a reduction in unskilled labor scarcity in 
the New World and to a rise in unskilled labor scarcity in Europe. Thus, global-
ization contributed to rising inequality in the United States and falling inequality 
in most of Europe. Falling unskilled labor scarcity in the U.S. meant rising skill 
scarcity, which contributed to the high school revolution there. Rising unskilled 
scarcity in Europe also contributed to the primary schooling and literacy revolu-
tion there.
Under what conditions would we expect the same responses to globalization 
in today’s world? The magnitude of the migrations matters. The skill-selectivity of 
the migrations matters. And the governmental response to market signals matters. 
It seems to me that we would gain considerable insight into the inequality and 
schooling responses to modern globalization forces by doing serious comparative 
analysis, and that analysis should include history.
Notes
This paper draws from a recent book with Timothy J. Hatton, Global Migration and the World Econ-
omy: Two Centuries of Policy and Performance (MIT Press, 2005). It has also been influenced by 
participants’ comments at the Center for Global Development Workshop on Emigration’s Impact 
on the Third World (September 11, 2006).
1 Other surveys can be found in O’Rourke and Williamson (1999); Bordo, Taylor, and Williamson 
(2003); Williamson (2006); and Hatton and Williamson (2005).
2 The modern economist may find it odd to discuss changing distribution without referencing the 
wages of skilled workers, while stressing land rents. Yet land and labor were the dominant fac-
tors of production a century ago, not skills and capital, as is true today.
3 The premium on U.S. skills relative to the unskilled was 53 percent in 1890, greater than Great 
Britain (33 percent) and Germany (35 percent), and much greater than the poorer parts of 
Europe (Hatton and Williamson 2005, Table 5.2, 90).
4  Among  the  northern  Italian  immigrants  to  the  U.S.  in  1899–1909,  88  percent  were  literate, 
whereas only 46 percent of southern Italian immigrants were literate (Hatton and Williamson 
2005, 407).2  Jeffrey G. Williamson
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